

Islamic Political Parties and Election Campaigns in Indonesia

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Abstract: Islamist political parties are a structural feature of politics across the Muslim world, raising persisting questions for scholars of democracy. Under what conditions will Islamists moderate to support democracy and pluralism? Under what conditions will they adopt more exclusive behavior? Taking a fresh approach, we focus on electoral competition and the conditions under which Islamic party candidates campaign using either inclusive nationalist appeals or exclusively Islamic appeals. Using a unique data source, we coded the appeals contained on the campaign posters of 572 Islamic party candidates in Indonesia. We found that demographics, urban-rural differences, and the level of government office (i.e., national or regional) affected the inclusive or exclusive nature of campaigns. We also highlight differences in appeals made by candidates from Muslim democratic and Islamist parties. The study illustrates the effectiveness of posters as a data source and presents a new approach to understanding the behavior of Islamic parties.

Keywords: Islam, political parties, democracy, election campaigns, candidate behavior, election posters

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Islamist parties—i.e., political parties that find a blueprint for social, moral, political, and economic reform in the teachings of the Islamic faith—are a structural feature of politics across the Muslim world (Kendhammer, 2016; Schwedler, 2011). These parties call on the state to implement and enforce Islamic law, especially on issues related to the media, the family, proselytizing, and apostasy. Their persistence has raised an important question for scholars of democracy. Will Islamist parties moderate to support democracy and pluralism, or will they pursue a more exclusive agenda?

The concern about Islamist parties' relationship to democracy is encapsulated in the phrase "one person, one vote, one time," meaning that if an Islamist party wins a democratic election, there is no certainty that it will agree to electoral competition in the future (Blaydes and Lo, 2011). Indeed, Islamist parties have gained power through elections and then led efforts to stifle pluralism and democratic liberties. Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) has become "immoderate" since 2011, guiding the country's move into authoritarianism (Kirdiş, 2018). After taking power in 2012, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) contributed to the closing of the country's nascent democratic opening (Pahwa, 2017). Islamists are not the sole cause of the collapse of democracy in Turkey and Egypt, but they certainly share in the responsibility.

In this paper, we highlight one specific aspect of moderation and immoderation—namely, the conditions under which Islamic parties—a category that includes *both* Islamist and Muslim democratic political parties—are likely to make either inclusive or exclusive appeals as part of their election campaigns. Our study focuses on campaign appeals made by Islamic party candidates in Indonesia. One of the most ethnically and religiously diverse countries in the world, Indonesia also has a national ideology, termed Pancasila, which is grounded in pluralism (Pepinsky et al., 2018). In that context, candidates' inclusive appeals were defined as containing nationalist imagery and messaging, whereas their exclusive appeals involved only Islamic imagery and messaging.

We demonstrate four determinants of Islamic party candidate appeals, the first of which is the religious demographics of a constituency. Candidates make the most inclusive nationalist appeals in highly heterogeneous constituencies where they recognize that, to win elections, they need to acknowledge religious pluralism in order to win substantial non-Muslim support. Conversely, candidates make more exclusive Islamic appeals in more homogeneously Muslim constituencies.

Second, contrary to the predictions of modernization theory, candidates are more likely to make more inclusive nationalist appeals in rural areas, but more exclusive Islamic appeals in urban areas. In this respect, our research supports the view of Islamists as a modern social movement rather than a relic of traditional values (Brooke and Ketchley, 2018).

Third, candidates competing at the national level make more inclusive nationalist appeals than those competing in regional (i.e., provincial or sub-provincial) contests. In the case of Indonesia, Islamic issues have resonated at the local level and been more successfully implemented by regional politicians—Sharia bylaws and regulations being a prime example. Meanwhile, Indonesian candidates running for the national legislature live and work in the capital, Jakarta, and are more absorbed with national issues.

Finally, as prior literature suggests, the ideology of the parties encourages more inclusive behavior by candidates from Muslim democratic parties, relative to the more exclusive nature of Islamist party candidates. The literature has not, however, mapped the implications of those differences. We find that Muslim democratic and Islamist candidates adapt to demographics in surprising ways.

These findings make three contributions to the scholarship on Islam, democracy, and political behavior. First, we provide an original framework for studying both moderation and immoderation processes at the same time, helping to address a problem in the stalled literature on Islamic political party development. Since most of the literature is qualitative and relies on national political parties, there have not been sufficient data points to study *both* inclusive and exclusive appeals through statistical analysis. We provide a mechanism for quantitative tests in the predominantly qualitative literature on Islamic party behavior (exceptions are Driessen, 2018; Kurzman and Naqvi, 2010; Kurzman and Türkoğlu, 2015).

Second, we present an original dataset of 755 election posters from 572 candidates, which we coded to identify candidates' inclusive and exclusive campaign appeals. This is the largest known collection of campaign material from Islamist and Muslim democratic parties ever used to explain election campaigns. This is also a new, novel, systematic, and scalable method for studying political campaigns. Analyzing these candidate posters, as opposed to (for instance) political party manifestos, is also particularly apt for the Indonesian case, since Indonesia uses a candidate-centric, open-list proportional representation (PR) system.

Third, whereas previous literature has largely used Islamic parties as the unit of analysis—broadly studying their platforms, policies, and views on democracy—our study is more granular. It analyzes Islamic party candidates' behavior at the constituency level so as to understand candidates' choice of campaign appeals. By obtaining data that resolves longstanding debates, we advance theory on the determinants of Islamic candidate's behavior and highlight unrecognized differences between the behavior of Islamists and Muslim democrats.

Understanding Islamic Political Party Behavior

Islamist Party Moderation

Although pundits have long questioned whether Islam is compatible with democracy, survey research has consistently demonstrated high levels of support for democracy across the Muslim world (Hoffman and Jamal, 2014; Kendhammer, 2016). Most pious Muslim voters support a democratic, pluralist political system in which Islam plays some role—a vision that observers have termed “Muslim democracy” (Driessen, 2018; Nasr, 2005). These Muslim democrats are contrasted with Islamists, who seek to impose a particularistic cultural vision on society through state control of the media and religious education.

Muslim democratic parties are generally considered compatible with democracy; Islamist parties are more problematic (Achilov and Sen, 2017; Driessen, 2018). Although forms of Islamism range broadly from militants such as the Taliban to conservative political parties such as the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, all Islamists desire to establish the Islamic faith as the blueprint for society and reject liberal, feminist, or other alternative approaches to sacred texts. As a result, scholars have long been investigating what factors cause Islamists to moderate their ideology. In the 2000s, scholars of political Islam argued that Islamists’ inclusion in democratic politics would foster their moderation. Wickham’s (2004: 207) article on the Egyptian Wasat party charted the emergence of a splinter faction from the Muslim Brotherhood that endorsed pluralism, equal rights, and popular sovereignty. Gurses (2014) showed that Islamists in Turkey developed positive attitudes toward electoral democracy to the extent that they were allowed to share power. Somer’s research on Turkish Islamists demonstrated that they developed in the direction of the country’s political center, which entailed not only democratic but authoritarian attributes. Somer (2014) found that Islamists did not travel a predictable linear progression from radicalism to liberalism but, rather, evolved in ways that were specific to the country, multidimensional, and—unfortunately—reversible.

Over the past 10 years, scholars have increasingly noted instances of Islamists moving away from moderation. In Turkey, the AKP has radicalized as a result of the waning possibility of EU accession and the weakening of the opposition parties and the judiciary (Bashirov and Lancaster, 2018). In Morocco, the Party of Justice and Development has moderated and strengthened, yet, paradoxically, political liberalization has been reversed as a result of the regime’s fear of its Islamist opposition (Wegner and Pellicer, 2009). After the Arab Spring, Pahwa (2017) found that the success of far-right Salafists in Egypt constrained the FJP’s ability to move toward the political center. Pahwa concluded that Islamists are forced to balance multiple electoral and constitutional priorities.

Overall, the moderation literature offers insights on how Muslim democrat and Islamist

party platforms, policy goals, and views on democracy may change through the experience of participating in government and engaging with the democratic process from one election to the next. In contrast, our research looks more squarely at Islamic parties within an electoral setting, examining how individual candidates mobilize support across constituencies during elections. In addition, while the literature focuses on how Islamic parties may or may not moderate over time, we map the extent of moderation across electoral districts since it is likely that an Islamic party candidate will consider how receptive their constituents are to Islamist appeals, and as a consequence, may make appeals that differ from fellow party candidates in other districts. Specifically, we map out the conditions under which Islamic party candidates mobilize constituents based on either pluralist and inclusive nationalist messaging or more narrow and exclusive Islamic appeals. The inclusive or exclusive nature of a candidate's campaign appeals matters because it presents an image of what their party stands. Moreover, the rhetoric of these local candidates can have a major impact on local communities, as these candidates are closest to constituents, sensitive to local issues, and well positioned to inflame or cool inter-religious tensions (Varshney 2002). As such, this article presents an alternative approach to understanding moderation, focusing on Islamic candidates during electoral competition instead of on Islamic parties in government. We hope that this approach will spark new insights.

Islamic Party Candidates' Behavior

To explain Islamic party candidates' behavior, our argument focuses on the pressures they face. First, we consider the constituencies that candidates emerge from and appeal to during an election campaign. We examine three forms of variation among constituencies: the size of the Muslim population, whether the electorate is urban or rural, and whether the candidate is appealing to a smaller (regional) or broader (national) electorate.

The literature on the impact of demography on the behavior of political elites and voters has been growing in recent years (e.g., Tajima et al., 2018). During electoral competition, candidates tend to mobilize ethnic and religious groups when such groups are large enough to form viable political coalitions (Huber, 2017; Posner, 2005). It thus follows that the size of the Muslim population in a constituency will affect the kinds of candidates that emerge and, consequently, their appeals. When the Muslim population is a minority, we expect candidates to make inclusive nationalist appeals to increase their vote share. By making such appeals in religiously diverse constituencies, Islamic party candidates can, to some degree, remove ideological differences as a stumbling block for secular Muslim voters, and maybe even for some non-Muslims who may find their anti-corruption commitments or other policies appealing (Pepinsky et al., 2018: 80). This dynamic becomes especially critical when the Muslim population is small. As the size of the Muslim population grows, so too does the proportion of

voters who might be attracted to more exclusive Islamic appeals and party labels. Hence, the presence of a larger Muslim constituency should facilitate greater exclusivity in candidates' campaign advertising.

Second, we examine the urban versus rural divide among constituencies. Modernization theorists such as Ernest Gellner (1983) posited that with the shift from a traditional agrarian to an industrial society, long-established indigenous, religious, and linguistic identities would fade and be replaced by class-based, occupational, and national identities. In more recent work on religious politics, Norris and Inglehart (2004) offered similar insights when comparing rural agricultural employees and urban workers. They found that urban Muslim workers were better educated and also more tolerant, due to their contact with non-Muslims and secular Muslims as well as their experiences of higher education and the manufacturing sector. Given these cultural differences, we might expect more moderate candidates to emerge, and to engage in more inclusive nationalist appeals, in urban than in rural areas.

However, two strands of research predict that modernization will have the opposite impact. In the ethnic politics literature, scholars have shown that modernization strengthens and politicizes ethnic and religious identities (e.g., Bates 1983; Eifert et al., 2010). They have claimed that urbanization and industrialization entail more competition for jobs. As a result, workers and elites in urban settings are motivated to exploit their ethnic and religious group membership to attain economic resources and political power. Other scholars have suggested that the political revival of Islam is not a function of traditional residues revered in rural hinterlands, but a 20th-century social movement that has emerged in modern urban sectors (Brooke and Ketchley, 2018). This literature contends that the urban middle class is more likely than rural agricultural workers to support Islamist politicians. Overall, the evidence seems to support this view that urban voters will be more receptive to exclusive Islamic appeals.

Third, we investigate whether the degree of exclusivity in candidate appeals varies depending on whether the candidate is competing for a seat in a regional or national legislature. In Indonesia, we expect that candidates campaigning for a regional legislative seat will tend to engage in more exclusive Islamic appeals and less inclusive nationalist appeals than those running for the national legislature. We should note that the expectation regarding Islamic appeals largely applies to the Muslim-majority constituencies, which are numerous. In Christian- and Hindu-majority constituencies, the regional or national nature of the election will have less impact due to the rarity or absence of Islamist appeals.

Two considerations drive our expectations. First, since democratization, Islamic issues have resonated more at the regional level. Many localities have seen a proliferation of local Sharia laws, Islamic issues have motivated mass protests in local elections, and Islamic vigilantes have often acted with impunity when persecuting minority groups at the local level.

Second, candidates running for the national legislature are more concerned with national issues and spend most of their time in Jakarta, with many of them living in the capital year-round. In contrast, regional legislative candidates live in their regions, among their constituents, and are more absorbed with regional issues than with the fray of national politics.

Finally, the ideological nature of parties—and specifically the ideological distinction between Islamist and Muslim democratic parties—matters. We expect Islamist candidates to make more exclusive Islamic appeals than Muslim democratic candidates. Figure 1 summarizes the impact that a candidate’s constituency and political party have on their choice of inclusive or exclusive appeals.




Figure 1. Model of how Islamic party candidates’ choice of inclusive nationalist or exclusive Islamic appeals are influenced by their constituency and political party.

Of course, the influences we have outlined here are not unique to Islamist or Muslim democratic candidates. Indeed, the predictions detailed above are largely drawn from the ethnic politics literature, which focuses more on variation across space than on change over time. All candidates, to varying degrees, must consider their constituency’s needs as well as their political party when developing a campaign strategy. Our objective here is to theorize specifically how these factors will affect candidates from Islamic parties.

Data and Methods

Islamic Parties in Indonesia

Indonesia provides an ideal field site for testing theories of Islamic party candidates' behavior. It is the world's largest Muslim-majority country and a consolidated democracy. Moreover, Indonesia has a large number of candidates from parties with nationalist, Muslim democratic, and Islamist ideological underpinnings, and the divisions between these ideologies are salient among voters and elites. In addition, candidates compete for national and regional legislative seats in constituencies that vary considerably in terms of the size of the Muslim population and their urban or rural nature. This variation allows us to test our hypotheses on what drives inclusion and exclusion.

The data for this article come from the 2009 Indonesian elections—a critical election as the electoral system had just switched from closed-list to open-list PR. As we will discuss below, this change has had an enduring impact on the personalist nature of campaigns that continues today. We studied all 11 Islamic parties that competed in 2009 and adopted the common scholarly categorization of Indonesian Islamic political parties (Baswedan, 2004; Buehler, 2013; Menchik, 2018; Pepinsky et al., 2018). Accordingly, our sample includes three Muslim democratic parties and five Islamist parties that competed across the country in 2009, plus three regional Islamist parties that competed only in the province of Aceh. It is important to note that the categorization of Islamist and Islamic parties comes from this literature rather than following post-hoc from our findings. A brief discussion of these parties follows.

The three Muslim democratic parties were Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (PKNU).¹ PAN was founded in 1998 by Amien Rais, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah (the second-largest Islamic civil society organization in Indonesia). PAN remains closely associated with Muhammadiyah and was considered a moderate Islamic party in 2009. PKB was also founded in 1998 by Abdurrahman Wahid, the former president and chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country's largest Islamic civil society organization. PKB draws its leadership from the older generation of NU activists, who were prominent in politics in the 1950s and 1970s when NU was a political party. PKNU was founded in 2006 by a splinter group from PKB.

The five Islamist parties that competed nationally were Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera

¹ The English translations are as follows: National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB), and Party of the Awakening of the Muslim Community (PKNU).

(PKS), and Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (PPNUI).² PPP is the oldest Islamist party in Indonesia, having been founded in 1973 when the dictator Suharto forced all Islamic parties to merge. Since democratization, it has continued to call for state application of Islamic law. PBR is a splinter group from PPP that met the 2% legislative threshold in the 2004 elections but not in 2009; it has since been absorbed into strongman Prabowo Subianto's party. Another older Islamist party is PBB, founded in 1998, which like PPP claims to have inherited the legacy of past generations of Islamists, specifically the 1950s party Masyumi. PKS was also created in 1998 as the political vehicle of a campus proselytizing network modeled after the cadre-based Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.³ PKS's cadre system makes it less personalist than the other parties and more disciplined (Buehler, 2013). Finally, PPNUI was founded in 1998 by a group of Islamist anti-Shia activists associated with NU.

Aceh is the only province that permits regional parties, in accordance with the 2005 peace accord that ended Aceh's secessionist war.⁴ Although numerous regional Acehese parties formed at that time, the three regional Islamist ones that competed in the 2009 election were Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (PAAS), Partai Bersatu Aceh (PBA), and Partai Damai Aceh (PDA).⁵ PAAS represented many of Aceh's religious clerics, PBA was founded by a former activist in Muhammadiyah, and PDA was the main vehicle for Acehese Islamic school clerics who were not affiliated with Aceh's secessionist movement (Barter, 2011).

Along with its diverse collection of political parties, Indonesia also has significant variation in terms of the constituencies to which candidates appeal. First, although most constituencies have a Muslim majority, many others are quite mixed or have Christian or Hindu majorities. Thus, the size of the Muslim population varies considerably across the country.⁶ Second, Indonesia is a vast nation with hundreds of constituencies, ranging from densely

² The English translations are United Development Party (PPP), Reform Star Party (PBR), Moon and Star Party (PBB), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (PPNUI).

³ PKS was initially the "Justice Party" (*Partai Keadilan*) but failed to meet the 2% threshold in the 1998 election. It was renamed the Prosperous Justice Party for the 2004 election.

⁴ The development of regional parties in other provinces is prevented because all parties outside Aceh must maintain party branches around the country.

⁵ The English translations are Prosperous and Safe Aceh Party (PAAS), United Aceh Party (PBA), and Aceh Sovereignty Party (PDA).

⁶ Overall, Indonesia's population is 88% Muslim. Christians (Catholics and Protestants) constitute 9.8% of the population, and there are smaller numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, and Confucians (2010 National Census).

populated cities with thriving urban sectors to far more sparsely populated rural constituencies that rely on farming and fishing. Since modernization theorists argue that urban voters will be more moderate than rural voters, Indonesia provides a good field site to assess whether candidates for office behave differently between urban and rural areas. Third, Indonesian candidates compete for national legislative seats in large constituencies, whereas regional legislative constituencies are smaller, at both the provincial and sub-provincial levels. Candidate appeals may be affected by either national or local agendas.

Importantly, 2009 was a watershed election because the introduction of open-list PR fundamentally changed campaigns, prompting candidates to connect personally with their constituencies. For the first time, Indonesian voters were casting their ballots for candidates, not parties. A party won seats based on the combined vote for all their candidates in the constituency, and seats were then awarded to the candidates who won the most votes in each constituency.⁷ This shift to open-list PR fostered intense intraparty competition and a scramble for personal votes. Since 2009, research on Indonesian legislative elections has shown that candidates have been empowered through their control and financing of personalist campaigns: they organize their own local campaign events, emphasize their personal attributes, court local ethnic and religious groups, and deploy personal networks of brokers to distribute patronage (Sherlock, 2009; Fox, 2018b; Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall and Berenschot 2019). Meanwhile, political parties play a less central role in campaigns, and both partisanship and party system institutionalization have weakened (Fox, 2018b; Fossati, 2020; Tomsa, 2014). As no other significant electoral changes have occurred since 2009, open-list PR has had an enduring impact on the candidate-centric nature of Indonesian elections.

Election Posters and Campaign Appeals

Existing studies of Islamic political parties have been largely qualitative. However, various types of data can be used to study the behavior of Islamic party candidates. They include candidates' websites and social media presence, their television advertisements and speeches, and coverage of individual candidates in newspaper reports. Unfortunately, these data sources may result in a skewed sample containing extensive information on the candidates who have ample resources but minimal information on the more marginal candidates.

Campaign posters are a promising type of data because they are inexpensive, low-tech, and used by virtually all candidates regardless of their budget. Election posters represent the most prominent form of campaign advertising in Indonesia and many other countries. They are

⁷ In 2004, voters could choose a candidate and their party, but it had little effect on campaigns because candidates needed to fill a full quota to win a seat. Given this high bar, only 2 candidates out of 548 actually won a seat from their personal votes.

usually large and colorful, featuring a main image of a candidate dressed in a suit or in Islamic or indigenous clothing, and packed with emotive messages, symbols, and images. Posters can have a significant impact on campaigns; the relatively few recent studies of election posters have shown that they can affect voting behavior by raising name recognition, signaling competitiveness, and increasing participation (Dumitrescu, 2012; Kam and Zechmeister, 2013; Panagopoulos, 2009). Posters can also help us understand the factors that influence local and national campaign strategies (Fox, 2018b). In fact, in Indonesia, many voters consider the influence of election posters (coupled with brochures) equal to or greater than that of television, newspapers, radio, or vote buying (Hill, 2009). By engaging in a content analysis of posters' textual and visual content, we can assess the degree to which some candidates make inclusive nationalist appeals while others make more exclusive Islamic appeals.

Photographs of election posters were gathered during the 2009 national, provincial, and district legislative election campaigns. Four weeks before the elections, we emailed a network of researchers located across Indonesia, asking them to take photos of election posters in the areas where they lived. These poster photos were gathered and stored in a database for analysis. This paper analyzes the 755 uniquely designed posters that promoted Islamist and Muslim democratic candidates.

Although the regions, neighborhoods, or streets from which the posters came were not randomly preselected,⁸ we do not believe that the regions where posters were photographed or the way in which researchers located them produced any kind of systematic bias. First, a large number of posters was gathered, from 572 candidates in 13 of Indonesia's 33 provinces, because our network of researchers was dispersed throughout the country. Second, there is no reason to believe that these researchers were cherry-picking particular types of election posters. The researchers were asked to photograph any and all posters in their area, and we encouraged them to photograph as many as possible by paying a small fee for each unique poster. We gave our research assistants no indication that the study concerned identity politics.

Third, posters were gathered from numerous constituencies. Our dataset encompasses posters from candidates in 66 constituencies—19 for the national legislature, 25 for the provincial legislatures, and 22 for the district (*Kabupaten/Kota*) legislatures. Finally, the sample of posters covers all 11 Islamic parties that competed in the 2009 election. The numbers of posters and candidates for each party were also proportional to party size, with PAN, PKS, and PPP taking up larger proportions. Ultimately, we have no reason to believe that the posters

⁸ To the best of our knowledge, no study has ever collected a truly random sample of election posters. In Indonesia, this would be particularly difficult given the short campaign period, the thousands of candidates, and the vastness of the country, which consists of islands stretching across an expanse of over 4,000 miles.

photographed were systematically different from those not photographed.

To analyze the appeals on the posters, multiple codes were created for the various types of candidate clothing, imagery, and textual content. Each poster was then coded twice, by one of the authors and a second coder, after which reliability tests were performed on all the coded posters. Identifying nationalist and Islamic clothing and imagery in the posters was relatively straightforward, not requiring much interpretation, so levels of intercoder reliability were high.⁹ For the textual content, the text from every poster was transcribed and then machine-coded using dictionaries of words that invoked nationalism and Islam.

After coding, posters were classified as having an exclusive Islamic appeal if they contained appeals to only one religion, Islam. They might display a candidate wearing Islamic clothing, headdress, and/or accessories; endorsements from Muslim organizations; images of Islamic elites; Islamic imagery (e.g., a mosque); Arabic writing; and/or Indonesian words relating to Islam. Posters were classified as having an inclusive nationalist appeal if they contained endorsements from nationalist organizations; images of nationalist elites; nationalist symbols (e.g., the national flag or country map); and/or Indonesian words relating to nationalism.

The dataset contains multiple poster designs from candidates. Because the argument relates to candidates' campaigns rather than specific poster designs, it was more appropriate to use the candidate as the unit of analysis and aggregate each individual candidate's posters. To do so, we calculated the proportion of a candidate's posters that were classified as having an inclusive nationalist appeal, from 0 to 1. The same logic was applied to candidate posters with exclusive Islamic appeals; this measure also ranged from 0 to 1.

Covariates and Model

To test the impact of Islamist or Muslim democratic party affiliation on inclusion and exclusion, we created a variable, *Islamist party candidate*, that took the value of 1 if the candidate was from any party that overtly self-identified as Islamist. As explained above, we used the categorization indicated in prior literature, so there were eight such parties (national parties PPNU, PBB, PBR, PKS, and PPP, and Acehnese parties PAAS, PBA, and PDA). This variable was set at 0 for candidates from the Muslim democratic parties, namely PAN, PKB, and PKNU. Although Islam is an important source of inspiration for these parties, they draw on the inclusive national ideology of Pancasila (Pepinsky et al., 2018). Half the candidates in the dataset were coded as Islamist party candidates; the other half were Muslim democrats.

⁹ After reliability testing, the authors identified all the inconsistent codings and determined the correct code. These corrections were reflected in the dataset of coded posters used in the analysis. See the online appendix for details on the codebook and results from the intercoder reliability tests.

To test the impact of different types of constituencies, we gathered data on the three key variables. First, we included the *Muslim population*, or the percentage of the Muslim population in each candidate's constituency based on the 2010 national census. Since Indonesia is 88% Muslim, most constituencies in Indonesia have Muslim majorities. These national demographics are reflected in our sample, with 508 candidates (89%) competing in Muslim-majority constituencies and 62 candidates (11%) in Muslim-minority constituencies. Second, as a measure of urbanization, we used the variable *Modern sector GRDP*, or the percentage of gross regional domestic product (GRDP) that comes from the modernized (i.e., non-agricultural) sector within the candidate's constituency. This amount was calculated by subtracting the farming and fishing GRDP from the total GRDP. Constituencies could encompass strictly urban areas, rural areas, or a combination of both. The percentage of GRDP coming from the modern sector ranged from 44% to 100%.¹⁰ Third, we created a binary variable, *Regional legislature*, which was equal to 1 if the candidate was competing for a seat in a regional legislature—provincial (DPRD *Propinsi*) or district (DPRD *Kabupaten/Kota*)—or 0 if running for the national legislature (DPD-RI).

One potential concern was how we coded a Muslim women candidate's headscarf as an Islamic appeal, since it is a social convention for Muslim women to wear the headscarf. To control for the use of the headscarf, we included a binary variable, *Female candidate*. Another concern was that the appeals of the 241 candidates competing in Java may be influenced by the island's distinctive politics and religious cleavages.¹¹ To control for these regional effects, we included a binary variable, *Java*. Finally, to control for any effect of competing for a seat in Jakarta, the nation's capital and seat of government, we included a binary *Jakarta* variable.

For the statistical analysis, we constructed a linear probability model (OLS) with robust standard errors on the two continuous dependent variables, namely nationalist appeals and Islamic appeals. Regressions were run using all candidates, as well as with subsets of Muslim democratic and Islamist candidates. This allowed us to see how our key factors affected candidates from each type of party. All key independent variables and controls were used in each regression. Alternative models and subsetting the data were used to deal with any issues related

¹⁰ We chose not to use the numbers of urban and rural people in a constituency published by the Indonesian statistics department, because it wasn't clear how these numbers were derived and it appeared to be a blunt measure—one-third of our candidates were from 16 constituencies that were categorized as 100% urban. Our measure is more transparent in its construction, fits with the underlying argument on modern sector employment, and offers more precision in estimating the level of urbanization, with gradations from 44% to 100% and no two constituencies having the same percentage.

¹¹ For a brief discussion of the cleavages among Muslims in Java, see Pepinsky et al. (2018: 43–51).

to posters that contained both nationalist and Islamic appeals; to consider candidates who had a limited number of posters; and to ensure that the use of the Muslim headscarf was not driving results. All these alternative model results (presented and discussed in the appendix) were consistent with the OLS statistical findings. As a result, the line charts with the predicted probabilities presented below are derived from the OLS models.

Results and Discussion

Constituency Influence

As discussed above, we assessed variation across different types of constituencies. The variations depended on the size of the constituency's Muslim population, the constituency's urban or rural nature, and whether it was a regional or national legislative constituency.

1. Minority- and Majority-Muslim Population Constituencies

First, we present the evidence on how the size of the Muslim population affects candidates' appeals. Figure 2a presents bar charts with the raw percentages of poster campaigns that contain nationalist and Islamic appeals in minority- and majority-Muslim constituencies for all candidates, Muslim democrats, and Islamists. Figure 2b presents the predicted probabilities of candidate poster campaigns containing nationalist and Islamic appeals, depending on the size of the Muslim population in the constituency. The solid black line represents all candidates, gray represents the Muslim democrats, and the dashed line represents the Islamists.¹²

The findings reveal three important insights regarding the impact of Muslim constituencies. First and foremost, the size of the Muslim population had a statistically significant and substantial impact on appeals. In line with our expectations, as the Muslim population grew, inclusive nationalist appeals declined and exclusive Islamic appeals increased. Where the Muslim population was small, the predicted percentage of candidates' posters with inclusive nationalist appeals was quite high (almost 70%) and exclusive Islamic appeals were quite low (25%). In contrast, in the more homogeneous Muslim constituencies, nationalist appeals plummeted to 30% while Islamic appeals rose to 50%.

Second, there is a distinct difference in how Muslim democrats and Islamists campaign. In Muslim-minority constituencies, Muslim democrats change their strategy primarily by reducing exclusive Islamist appeals while Islamist candidates primarily increase their inclusive nationalist appeals. This pattern is visible in the heights of the bar charts and in the slopes of the

¹² See Appendix Table A6 for the underlying regressions for this figure and for Figures 3, 4, and 5. Probabilities were calculated while holding all other independent and control variables at their mean.

predicted probabilities in Figure 2.¹³ It suggests something “sticky” about inclusive nationalist appeals for Muslim democrats and about exclusive Islamic appeals for Islamists. Both groups adapt to the size of the Muslim and non-Muslim population by adjusting the frequency of the identity appeals that are less central to their core political identity, but without abandoning the type of appeals more aligned with their ideology.

Third, among all the candidates, 50% of campaign posters did not use exclusive Islamic appeals in constituencies with majority Muslim populations. This finding contrasts with the impression of stark Islamic politics that is common in election reports on Indonesia. Even among Islamic parties, explicit visual or verbal Islamic appeals are not as common as we might have expected, given the high levels of piety among Indonesian Muslims (but see Pepinsky et al., 2018). Overall, the size of the Muslim constituency had the most substantial effect on the appeals of Islamic party candidates.




Figure 2. The Muslim population and candidates’ appeals.

¹³ These differences are also statistically significant. See Appendix Table A6.

2. Rural and Urban Constituencies

Next, we present evidence on the impact of urbanization. The bar charts in Figure 3a illustrate the level of appeals in urban and rural constituencies, while the line charts in Figure 3b show the predicted probabilities of appeals by the degree of urbanization. The evidence from these charts indicates that as constituencies become more urban, inclusive nationalist appeals decline while exclusive Islamic appeals increase. Moreover, the rural–urban distinction had a greater impact on Islamist candidates than on Muslim democrats. Compared to Muslim democrats, Islamists in urban areas used fewer inclusive nationalist appeals, while Islamists in rural areas used more Islamic appeals (Figure 3a). This is exactly the opposite of what modernization theory would predict. However, this finding should not surprise us, as there are two possible reasons for the presence heightened exclusive Islamic appeals in urban areas.




Figure 3. The district type and candidates' appeals.

First, as noted by scholars of ethnicity such as Bates (1983) and Eifert et al. (2010), urban areas and their modern sectors are competitive places. In these areas, religion becomes a tool by which candidates can mobilize groups and confine the expenditure of scarce resources to one group. Moreover, there is strong evidence that middle-class Indonesians in urban areas are more receptive to Islamist appeals (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018). This is not just an Indonesian phenomenon; political Islam has taken hold in urban areas in other countries as well (Brooke and Ketchley, 2018).

3. Regional and National Constituencies

Finally, we looked at the difference between campaigns in regional and national constituencies. Constituencies of regional legislatures are geographically smaller and less diverse;¹⁴ in addition, regional politicians compete for positions that are below the fray of national politics. For the most part, regional candidates are not high-profile politicians who belong to or have close connections to national party leadership. Furthermore, unlike the national legislative candidates who often reside in Jakarta, regional legislative candidates live and work among their constituents.

The bar charts and predicted probabilities in Figure 4 present the evidence on regional and national constituencies. In terms of nationalist appeals, the raw figures in the bar charts indicate that candidates in regional constituencies made fewer inclusive nationalist appeals. Twenty-nine percent of regional candidates' poster campaigns had nationalist appeals as opposed to 46% of candidates in national constituencies, a statistically significant difference. As for exclusive Islamic appeals, regional candidates made them more often (by 49% to 39% for national candidates), and again the difference was statistically significant.

Findings from previous studies help us understand why Islamic appeals are more common at the regional level. They have pointed out that since Indonesia's transition to democracy, political Islam has been more powerful at the local than the national level. Regulations inspired by Islamic law have proliferated among municipalities (Buehler, 2016; Bush, 2008). Police have proved unwilling or unable to prevent majoritarian violence against small Muslim-minority sects such as the Ahmadiyah (Menchik, 2016). Candidates appear to have learned from this pattern that exclusive Islamic appeals may have traction at the local level. Meanwhile, repeated attempts to pass ordinances enacting Islamic law at the national level have failed.

¹⁴ These constituencies had a mean population of approximately 1.6 million (provincial) and 1 million (sub-provincial), whereas national constituencies had a mean population of 3 million.




Figure 4. National and regional legislative elections and candidates' appeals.

To further explore how living close to one's constituents (as regional candidates do) might affect appeals, we gathered candidate residency data. We focused on candidates competing for the national legislature and then compared the appeals of the 40 candidates who chose to live in the constituency where they won a seat with another 49 who chose to live in the capital of Jakarta, outside their constituency but close to the national legislature. Candidates who resided in the constituency they served made more Islamic appeals (41% versus 34%) but fewer nationalist appeals (37% versus 56%).¹⁵ This result adds more evidence that living among their constituents prompts candidates to connect with constituents along religious lines, whereas living in Jakarta, distant from their constituents, resulted in a more nationalist campaign strategy. Moreover, the national legislative candidates competing for a seat within a Jakarta-based constituency made more nationalist appeals than other candidates.

¹⁵ In these computations, we excluded the 14 candidates who had won seats based within Jakarta. The variation was largely driven by the Muslim democrat candidates. See Appendix Figure A1 for more detail.

Political Party Influence

Next, we assess the influence of political parties on candidates' appeals. Figure 5 presents the predicted probabilities of nationalist and Islamic appeals by Muslim democrat and Islamist party candidates. The bars indicate that compared to the Islamist candidates, Muslim democrat candidates made more inclusive nationalist appeals and fewer exclusive Islamic appeals. Thus, in line with expectations, candidates' campaign appeals tended to be aligned with the ideology of their political parties.




Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of candidates' appeals by party type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Although these differences are consistent with our expectations, there were some outliers. Importantly, divergent patterns of appeals suggest other factors that may influence campaign appeals. First, PNKU was an outlier because it had the highest level of Islamic appeals among all the Muslim democratic parties. PKNU's Islamic appeals were particularly prominent when compared to those of PAN, even though both parties were Muslim democrats with connections to Islamic organizations. The main feature distinguishing the two parties' posters was that PKNU's posters often included images of their religious leaders whereas PAN's posters did not. In part, this contrast can be explained by differences in their Islamic organizations' leadership. Well-known and highly respected religious clerics lead NU, and including their images on posters can effectively attract voter attention. On the other hand, lay leaders play more prominent roles in Muhammadiyah, and their images would probably garner less notice. For examples of the two parties' posters, see Figure 6. The first poster, from a PKNU candidate, includes images of NU religious leaders and states in formal Javanese that we should all join with the Kyai (Islamic

clerics). The second example is a typical PAN poster, lacking religious leaders.

The other outlier was PKS, which had the lowest level of Islamic appeals of all the Islamist parties but the highest level of nationalist appeals among all parties. Although PKS is Islamist, it differs from the other parties because it is based on the cadre system, like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. PKS has an institutionalized and rigorous recruitment process, making it a more cohesive party with higher degrees of loyalty among its cadre (Buehler, 2013). It also has a strong party label, which is heavily promoted in campaigns. In the posters, PKS candidates frequently dressed in their party clothing (see Figure 6, right). Moreover, the party is strongly associated with Islam, largely due to its support for Sharia-based laws. As a result, the promotion of the PKS party label in campaigns may displace the need for additional explicit Islamic appeals. Overall, even though PKS candidates had lower levels of Islamic appeals, their appeals were affected by the constituency factors in the same way as those of the other Islamist parties.¹⁶



Figure 6. Election posters from PKNU, PAN, and PKS.

Finally, the Acehese regional Islamist parties eschewed inclusive nationalist appeals in favor of a more strictly Islamic image. Notably, in Aceh they used more Islamic appeals than other candidates, including the Islamist candidates supported by parties that competed nationally (Figure 7). There is a good reason for this strategy: the Acehese parties compete only for regional legislative seats in Aceh—a province with a large and deeply religious Muslim majority—so there is no reason to moderate their appeals to Islam. Similarly, in a cross-country study,

¹⁶ See the appendix for regression models with PKS only.

Brancati (2006: 196) reported that regionally based parties had a higher tendency to reinforce regional identities, mobilize ethnic groups, and produce legislation in favor of certain ethnic groups than parties that competed nationally.




Figure 7. Nationalist and Islamic appeals by Muslim democrat and Islamist parties competing in Aceh. These posters were photographed in Aceh’s capital, Banda Aceh, which is located on the northern tip of Sumatra. The city is homogeneously Islamic (96%), and the great majority of its population is indigenously Acehness (86%).

Overall, party ideology, and specifically the distinction between Muslim democratic and Islamist parties, is useful in understanding candidates’ behavior. However, the examples of PKNU, PKS reveal how internal party dynamics and organization can also affect electoral appeals. Meanwhile, the Islamist Acehness parties illustrate how parties with a purely regional focus have greater leeway to tailor their appeals to their regional constituents, potentially resulting in more exclusive campaign appeals.

Conclusion

This paper has identified a number of conditions that influence the choice between inclusive nationalist appeals and exclusive Islamic appeals among Islamic party candidates. We have demonstrated that demographics, urban–rural differences, the level of government, and party ideology affect candidates’ appeals. Islamic parties are not uniform or teleological by nature but, like other political parties, respond to the specific political and social contexts in which they

operate.

Demographic factors had the most substantial effect on candidate appeals, but the presence of non-Muslim constituents influenced the appeals of Islamist and Muslim democratic candidates differently. Muslim democrats reduced their exclusive Islamic appeals but maintained high levels of nationalist appeals; Islamists increased their nationalist appeals but maintained high levels of Islamic appeals. This surprising finding suggests that Islamic parties campaign by varying their appeals related to a secondary party identity, depending on the electoral context, but do not diverge from their core party identity. In this study, we have focused on the dynamics of Muslim democrat and Islamist parties, but to expand our understanding of moderation across the whole party system, future work could incorporate non-Islamic parties. In Indonesia, this would mean studying whether the key factors affect secular-nationalist party candidates in similar or different ways.

Whereas many studies of campaigns have relied on party manifestos and platforms as evidence, this study highlights the usefulness of election posters—a widely available, replicable, and transparent source of campaign appeals—as a data source. Election posters also offer the advantage of mapping candidate appeals on the ground and among the masses, whereas party manifestos often reflect only the preferences of the party leaders and may not be widely disseminated.

Although our poster data come from a single country, the findings should be applicable beyond Indonesia. Our key variables (such as party ideology and religious demographics) are not particular to Indonesia and are likely to affect Islamic (and non-Islamic) candidates' behavior elsewhere in similar ways. The inclusive or exclusive campaign behavior of candidates is a key issue for many political parties around the world and in any policy setting where anti-system parties are integrated into democratic institutions.

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